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Introduction and summary
In the last ten years, residential investment as a share 
of gross domestic product (GDP) has reached levels 
not seen since the 1950s. At the same time, the home-
ownership rate has climbed to levels never before 
achieved. This article discusses the forces underlying 
these developments and argues that they are connected.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of nominal residential 
investment to GDP from 1947 to 2005, with shaded 
regions indicating years in which the economy was in 
recession. The spending share of residential investment 
is clearly highly cyclical, but in the last ten years it has 
seemed relatively immune to macroeconomic distur-
bances. Indeed, from a near historic low below 3.5 per-
cent in 1991, residential investment spending has grown 
rapidly, passing 6 percent of nominal GDP in 2005.
Figure 2 shows the history of the homeownership 
rate from 1890 to 2004. The homeownership rate equals 
the number of owner-occupied housing units divided 
by the number of occupied housing units. Between 1890 
and 1940, the homeownership rate varied between 43 
percent and 48 percent. After World War II, the hom-
eownership rate rose rapidly, and by the mid-1960s it 
had surpassed 64 percent. Upward progress in home-
ownership stalled in the 1970s and even fell in the 
1980s. It began growing again in the mid-1990s and 
by 2005 had reached a new high of 69 percent.
Understanding why residential investment and 
homeownership have reached such unusually high 
levels is useful from a policymaking standpoint. For 
example, monetary policy has been traditionally viewed 
as having a strong influence over new home construc-
tion. Have the high levels of residential investment been 
driven by unusually loose monetary policy? Another 
concern of policymakers is that the unusually high level 
of spending on new housing reflects speculation and 
is not driven by underlying fundamentals. The increase 
of rates of homeownership has long been an announced 
goal of policymakers. Indeed, both Presidents Clinton 
and George W. Bush have touted the rising levels of 
homeownership as accomplishments of their adminis-
trations. So, understanding why homeownership rates 
have risen should help in the development of policies 
directed at establishing socially and economically de-
sirable levels of homeownership.
Much has been said in the press about high levels 
of house prices and the possibility of a house price bub-
ble. Figure 3 displays the median sales price of exist-
ing single family homes, converted into real terms by 
dividing total sales price by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for all urban consumers. This figure shows that 
indeed the real price of single-family homes, after be-
ing roughly stable from the early 1980s to the mid-
1990s has grown considerably since. This article does 
not address house prices directly. Rather, it seeks to un-
derstand recent developments by focusing on quanti-
ties. To the extent that the quantities can be understood 
by considering the underlying economic fundamen-
tals, such as productivity growth and the evolution  
of the mortgage market, then the recent growth in 
house prices is probably not due to excessive specula-
tion in the housing market, such as occurs in a bub-
ble. We argue that our findings point toward the high 
prices being driven by fundamentals.
The article begins by describing the evolution  
of key variables that should influence residential in-
vestment. While informative, this discussion has the 
drawback that it is difficult to distinguish the truly  
exogenous factors driving the spending. For example, 
showing that real interest rates have been relatively 
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Nominal GDP share of residential investment, 1947–2005
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, national income and product 








1947 ’52 ’57 ’62 ’67 ’72 ’77 ’82 ’87 ’92 ’97 2002
FiguRE 2
U.S. homeownership rate, 1890–2004
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, and the U.S. Bureau of  
Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey, Series 
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low as residential investment has surged 
beyond its trend level does not establish 
that unusually loose monetary policy is to 
blame. Consequently, the next phase of 
the analysis involves an econometric 
study of the effects of identified exoge-
nous shocks to the economy. This study 
focuses on the roles of technological 
change and monetary policy.
We then turn to the homeownership 
issue. We begin by describing how home-
ownership rates have changed across var-
ious racial, generational, educational, and 
income categories. Then we address the 
question of how much of the increase in 
homeownership can be explained by 
changes in the distribution of the popula-
tion across these categories. For example, 
older people have higher homeownership 
rates than younger people, so, all else be-
ing equal, an aging population tends to 
increase the homeownership rate. By ac-
counting for all easily measurable factors, 
this analysis provides a bound on what 
needs to be explained by other, more dif-
ficult to measure factors, such as the in-
creased use of new mortgage products.
The final part of the article connects 
the overall increase in residential invest-
ment with the increase in homeowner-
ship. This analysis focuses on the impact 
of the rapid growth of the subprime mort-
gage market.
Our main findings are as follows. 
First, it appears that the housing boom 
has not been driven by unusually loose 
monetary policy. This is not to say that 
monetary policy has not been unusually 
loose, but that to the extent it has been 
loose, this is not what has been driving 
spending on housing. Second, the current 
levels of spending on housing are largely 
explained by the wealth created by dra-
matic technological progress over the 
previous decade. Third, changes in the 
demographic, income, educational, and 
regional structure of the population account for only 
one-half of the increase in homeownership. That is, 
without any other developments, the homeownership 
rate is likely to have gone up anyway, but not by 
nearly as much as it has done. The last finding is that 
substitution away from rental housing made possible 
by technology-driven developments in the mortgage 
market, such as subprime lending, could account for  
a significant fraction of the increase in residential in-
vestment and homeownership. The current spending 
boom thus may be a temporary transition toward an 
era with higher homeownership rates and a share of 
spending on housing that is nearer historical norms.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Log real median sales price of existing single family homes
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Association  
of Realtors, Economics and Research Division, “Home sales,” report, and 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, report, from 
Haver Analytics.
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Log residential investment per household
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of  
Economic Analysis, national income and product accounts data, and the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, report, from 
Haver Analytics.
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Factors affecting residential investment
Figure 4 is helpful as a starting point for gauging 
whether residential investment is currently at unusual 
levels. The figure displays the log of real residential 
investment per household from 1947 to 2005 along 
with a trend line. While certainly subject 
to large cyclical variations, residential in-
vestment seems to follow a linear trend 
quite closely. So while investment grew 
rapidly after 1991 until the latter part of 
the decade, this was largely a return to 
trend. Only after the 2001 recession has 
spending grown substantially above trend. 
By 2005, it was roughly as far above trend 
as occurred during the boom part of the 
boom–bust cycle of the 1970s and the 
early 1980s. The dramatic swings in resi-
dential investment in the 1970s and early 
1980s contributed significantly to three 
recessions. From this perspective, the 
current levels of residential investment 
may seem alarming. In the remainder of 
this section, we consider some of the fac-
tors that may underlie the current high 
levels of residential investment.
Household formation
Household formation, to the extent 
that it is governed primarily by long-term 
social and demographic developments, is 
the most basic determinant of home build-
ing and residential investment.1 Indeed, if 
vacancy rates were constant and houses 
were never torn down to be replaced by  
new residential structures, new home build-
ing would be exactly proportional to new 
household formation.2 Figure 5 shows the 
evolution of new households and housing 
starts since 1960. The light blue lines in-
dicate the number of new households in a 
given year, the black lines indicate the 
average number of new households per 
year for each decade, and the dark blue 
line indicates the level of housing starts. 
In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, there 
seems to be a close association between 
home building and household formation. 
The increases in household formation and 
home building over the 1970s are an ex-
ample of the strong influence of demo-
graphic factors—this is when the baby 
boom generation moved out on its own. 
The close association of home building 
with household formation is less true of the 1960s, 
when home building is near its 1980 levels, but new 
household formation is much lower. Since the 2001 
recession, housing starts have also risen to levels that 
do not seem closely tied to new household formation.32 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
FiguRE 5
New households and housing starts
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, report, and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, report, from  
Haver Analytics.
thousands














Another factor determining new 
home building is migration. With migra-
tion, the number of households can stay 
fixed while there is still a demand for 
new homes. In the region where house-
holds migrate from, vacancy rates go up, 
while in the region where households  
migrate to, houses need to be built. To  
assess the possible impact of migration, 
consider figure 6. Panel A shows the 
shares of national population increases  
attributable to the four census regions 
from 1982 to 2005. Panel B displays  
the corresponding shares of all housing 
starts. In each case, a rising or falling 
share indicates that either population  
or housing starts are increasing faster in 
the region than for the nation as a whole. 
This figure shows that the relative shares 
of housing starts generally correspond to 
the relative population shares. Some of 
the trends seem to correspond as well. 
For example, the dip in the share of hous-
ing starts for the South in the 1980s is associated with 
a downward trend in the population share as well. Of 
particular interest is the uptick in the population share 
of the South from 2000 to 2005. Consistent with a 
role for migration in the current housing boom, the 
share of housing starts also picked up, although with 
a delay.
Interest rates
The discussion until now has focused on relative-
ly long-term developments. As is evident from figures 
1 and 2, home building historically has been highly 
cyclical. The conventional wisdom on why this is so 
is that the demand for housing is sensitive to movements 
in mortgage rates. If mortgage rates are unusually low, 
then this could fuel unusually high rates of residential 
investment. Figure 7 displays a measure of the nomi-
nal effective mortgage rate along with an estimate of 
the corresponding real rate. The term “effective” means 
that the mortgage rate incorporates the various points, 
fees, and other closing costs associated with a mort-
gage. These have generally been declining since the 
early 1980s. The real rate is equal to the nominal rate 
less an estimate of the expected rate of inflation. The 
inflation rate used for this figure is equal to the infla-
tion rate in the national income and product accounts 
(NIPA) personal consumption expenditure deflator 
over the previous year. This probably overstates actu-
al changes in the expectations relevant for determin-
ing housing demand.3 Figure 7 shows that both real 
and nominal mortgage rates were low in the 1990s com-
pared with the 1980s. This presumably contributed to 
the return to trend of residential investment over this 
period. Interestingly, the period when home building 
accelerated beyond its trend level was also a time when 
nominal and real rates were falling even further. While 
over the last two years nominal mortgage rates have 
started creeping up, real rates have continued to fall 
because inflation expectations have been rising. These 
considerations suggest that sustained low interest rates, 
possibly driven by unusually loose monetary policy, 
could be fueling the housing boom.
Wealth
The final factor affecting home building that we 
consider is household wealth. All else being equal,  
the richer households are, the more housing they de-
mand. The latter half of the 1990s was a period of 
rapid wealth accumulation. For example, according  
to the Survey of Consumer Finances, average family 
net worth increased by 72 percent between 1995 and 
2001. These increases in wealth were primarily due 
to the large increases in stock values over this period. 
As a consequence, housing and other nonfinancial  
assets’ average share of total assets, fell from 63.3 
percent in 1995 to 58 percent in 2001. If the share in 
1995 was “normal” or close to the “desired” house-
hold allocation of nonfinancial assets in households’ 
portfolios, then it is to be expected that the share 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FiguRE 6
New households and housing starts, by region
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census, report, and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, report, from  
Haver Analytics.
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B. Share of housing starts
share
would eventually start rising again. Indeed, by 2004, 
nonfinancial assets’ share of total assets had risen to 
64.3 percent, near its 1995 level. While the share of 
housing in total assets, in the form of primary resi-
dences, rose faster over this period, the behavior of 
nonfinancial assets as a whole suggests that much of 
the acceleration in residential investment after the 
2001 recession might be due to households rebalanc-
ing their portfolios. That is, it may be a natural con-
sequence of the stock market boom of the 1990s.4
The macroeconomic shocks driving 
residential investment
The foregoing discussion suggests 
various factors that may be influencing 
the high levels of residential investment, 
but the underlying causes remain unclear. 
Determining the causes of macroeconomic 
fluctuations is notoriously difficult because 
essentially all the variables of interest are 
endogenous—no single variable moves 
independently and drives movements in 
other variables. The traditional approach 
to assessing the causes of fluctuations is 
to posit that the economy is subject to  
exogenous random disturbances, which 
are called shocks. Macroeconomists have 
formulated methods for identifying three 
kinds of shocks—two kinds of shocks to 
technological possibilities and one kind 
of monetary policy shock.5 The procedure 
for identifying these shocks involves spec-
ifying a statistical model of the variables  
of interest and making a series of identifi-
cation assumptions that make it possible 
to extract the exogenous shocks from the 
statistical model. Once the shocks have 
been identified, it is possible to determine 
how much of the growth in residential  
investment from 1995 to 2005 can be  
attributed to these shocks using what is 
called a historical decomposition. The 
strategy for identifying the technology 
shocks builds on Fisher (2006) and the 
monetary policy shock identification 
builds on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans (2005).
Identifying the exogenous shocks
We begin by supposing that the 
economy evolves according to the fol-
lowing vector autoregression (VAR):
1)  Aqt = Γ(L)qt–1 + εt ,
where qt is a vector of variables of interest to be spec-
ified in a moment, εt is a vector of fundamental shocks, 
and A is a matrix of coefficients conformable with qt. 
The term Γ(L) is called a lag polynomial. It specifies 
how many lags of qt appear in equation 1 and is de-
fined as
Γ Γ Γ Γ Γ ( ) =   +   +   +   +  , 0 1 L L L L
2 M
1  M34 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
FiguRE 7
Nominal and real effective mortgage rates
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Board  data and U.S. Bureau of Economic 
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where the Γi, i = 1,2,..., M are matrices  
of the same dimensions as A, and L is a 
lag operator. Lag operators have the 
property that Lnxt = xt–n, for any variable 
xt. Equation 1 specifies the exogenous 
shocks that drive fluctuations in the vari-
ables in qt and how these variables  
interact contemporaneously and dynami-
cally. We suppose that
qt = [Δpt, Δyt, πt, Rt, ht]′,
where pt is the log real price of capital 
equipment, yt is the log of real per capita 
GDP, πt is inflation, Rt is the federal funds 
rate, ht is the log ratio of nominal residen-
tial investment to nominal GDP, and Δxt 
for some variable xt, such as pt or yt, is 
shorthand for writing xt – xt–1.6 We use a 
series of instrumental variables regres-
sions to estimate A, Γ(L), and the funda-
mental shocks, and simulate equation 1 
with the identified shocks to determine 
how these shocks have influenced residential invest-
ment. The equations were estimated using data from 
the third quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 2005 
with four lags.
The assumptions used to identify the two tech-
nology shocks are derived from growth theory. In 
particular, we assume that all growth and wealth  
accumulation derive from two kinds of exogenous 
random technological change. One source of techno-
logical change increases the quality and efficiency of 
capital equipment, that is, it is embodied in new capi-
tal equipment. Shocks to the rate of accumulation of 
this kind of technology are called investment-specific 
technology shocks. For simplicity, we will call them 
“I-shocks.” To identify these shocks, we assume that 
they are the only disturbances which have a long-run 
impact on the real price of capital equipment. The other 
source of technological change improves the economy’s 
ability to produce all kinds of goods. Shocks to the rate 
of accumulation of this kind of technology are called 
neutral technology shocks, “N-shocks” for short.  
To identify these shocks, we assume that, along with 
I-shocks, they are the only shocks that affect output 
in the long run.
Our strategy for identifying the monetary policy 
shock, an “R-shock,” has been widely applied in the 
empirical macroeconomic literature. The basis of this 
strategy is the assumption that the Federal Reserve 
follows a simple rule for setting the federal funds rate. 
This rule is subject to shocks, which can be thought 
of as randomness in the deliberations of the Federal 
Open Market Committee or factors uncorrelated with 
the variables in the rule that affect decisions on how 
to set the federal funds rate. Examples of the latter 
might be a hurricane or a terrorist attack. We assume 
that the Fed looks at contemporaneous values of the 
equipment price, output and inflation, as well as lags 
of qt when setting the federal funds rate.
The three sets of identifying assumptions can be 
translated into assumptions about the structure of equa-
tion 1. First, consider the assumption used to identify 
the I-shock. To apply this assumption we use the first 
regression of equation 1, which can be written
2)  Δpt =  Γpp(L)Δpt–1 + Γpy(L)Δyt + Γpπ(L)πt  
    + ΓpR(L)Rt + Γph(L)ht + εit, 
where the Γxy(L) values here and below are the rele-
vant lag polynomials plucked from Γ(L). From this 
equation we can see that the contemporaneous effects 
of all non-εit shocks influence Δpt through Δyt, πt, Rt, 
and ht. Our assumption for identifying the I-shocks 
implies that the long-run multipliers from these vari-
ables to pt are zero. The long-run multiplier associated 
with a variable in equation 2 is given by the sum of 
the lag coefficients for that variable. This sum can be 
calculated by evaluating the lag polynomial associated 
with that variable at L = 1. So the identifying assump-
tion for the I-shock is equivalent to assuming 35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Rt =  ΓRp(L)Δpt + ΓRy(L)Δyt + ΓRπ(L)πt + ΓRR(L)Rt–1 
  + ΓRh(L)ht–1+εrt.
This is our hypothesized monetary policy rule, which 
incorporates our assumption that it depends on con-
temporaneous values of pt, yt, and πt. The residuals 
from this equation are our estimates of the monetary 
policy shocks,  ˆ . rt ε
The effects of the identified shocks
To build intuition for our historical decomposi-
tion of the path of residential investment after 1995,  
it is helpful to study some impulse response functions. 
An impulse response function describes how a vari-
able, for example, residential investment, responds to 
a hypothetical exogenous shock with all other shocks 
set to zero. To the extent that the impulse response 
functions make sense, we can have confidence in the 
quality of the historical decompositions. Responses 
of output (per capita GDP in consumption units), the 
real equipment price, and per capita residential invest-
ment in consumption units to positive one standard 
deviation I-, N-, and R-shocks are displayed in figure 8. 
The units of the responses are percentage deviations 
from the path that would have been followed absent 
the shock. The magnitude of the response of a vari-
able to a given shock indicates that shock’s impor-
tance to the variable’s fluctuations around trend.
The responses to the I-shock show the equipment 
price falling to its new long-run level, output rising to 
its new long-run level, and residential investment ini-
tially falling and then rising to the same long-run level 
as output.7 The long-run responses of these variables 
are predicted by theory. Cheaper equipment encourages 
capital accumulation, which, in turn, raises labor pro-
ductivity and output. The short-run response of residen-
tial investment makes sense because, until capital and 
wealth accumulate and increase the demand for housing, 
a fall in the equipment price should induce substitution 
away from other capital goods, including housing.
The increases in output, the equipment price, and 
residential investment after an N-shock are, at least 
qualitatively, also consistent with theory. An N-shock 
raises productivity, thereby encouraging capital accu-
mulation, higher employment, and an increase in out-
put. Since an N-shock directly affects output, while an 
I-shock affects output indirectly through capital accu-
mulation, the N-shock has a faster impact on output. 
The equipment price responds by only a small amount. 
Qualitatively, it rises after the shock and then returns 
to its pre-shock level. This makes sense if the N-shock 
Γpy(1) = Γpπ(1) = ΓpR(1) = Γph(1) = 0.
This means that each Γpj(L), j = y, π, R, h can be written, 
Γ Γ pj pj L L L ( )= ( ) − ( )  1 .So, by imposing the I-shock 
identifying assumption, equation 2 becomes
3 1
2 ) ∆ = ( )∆ + ( )∆ + ( )∆
+ ( )∆ + (
− p L p L y L
L R L







) )∆ + ht it ε .
In general, disturbances to Δpt affect the contem-
poraneous values of Δyt, πt, Rt, and ht. That is, εvt is 
correlated with the other right-hand side variables in 
equation 3. Consequently, equation 3 cannot be esti-
mated by ordinary least squares. However, assuming 
εvt is exogenous means this shock is independent of 
all variables dated t – 1 and earlier. So equation 3 is 
estimated by instrumental variables, using M lags of 
qt as instruments. The coefficients of the first regression 
of equation 1 are found by unraveling the resulting 
regression coefficients from the instrumental variables 
estimation. The residuals from equation 3 are our es-
timates of  ˆ , . vt it ε ε
By a similar argument used with the first regres-
sion, the assumptions used to identify the N-shocks 
imply the long-run multipliers from πt, Rt, and ht are 
zero in the second regression of equation 1. It follows 
that this second regression can be written
4 1 ) ∆ = ( )∆ + ( )∆ + ( )∆
+ ( )∆ + ( )∆
− y L p L y L
L R L
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where the   Γyj L j h q ( ) = , ,  are defined in the same 
way as the similar terms in equation 3. As before, this 
equation is estimated by instrumental variables, and 
the resulting coefficient estimates are used to assign 
values to the second row of coefficients in equation 1. 
The instruments are  ˆit ε  and M lags of qt. The residuals 
from equation 4,  ˆ , nt ε  are our estimates of εnt. Including 
ˆit ε  as an instrument ensures  ˆnt ε  is uncorrelated with 
the I-shock within the sample period.
We estimate the remaining regressions of equa-
tion 1 sequentially by instrumental variables, using 
the residuals from the previously estimated regressions 
and M lags of qt as instruments. We do not formally 
identify the residuals of the third and fifth regressions 
with any particular shock, since, unlike the other re-
siduals, we do not have a theory to justify doing so. 
Without loss of generality, in the third regression we 
assume that inflation does not respond to contempo-
raneous movements in Rt. The fourth regression of 
equation 1 can be written36 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
encourages a short-run increase in the de-
mand for investment goods relative to 
consumption goods, which it does in 
many theoretical models. Output rises to-
ward its new long-run level. Residential 
investment initially surges, then falls 
back toward zero, before rising toward its 
long-run level. This kind of response is 
more difficult to reconcile with existing 
theories. However, the initial surge in res-
idential investment is consistent with the 
rise in output, if housing demand is in-
creasing in income.
The R-shock responses show that 
output and the equipment price respond 
by very little, but residential investment 
responds strongly, falling by about 1 per-
cent. That residential investment is par-
ticularly sensitive to a monetary policy 
shock is consistent with traditional views 
about the monetary transmission 
mechanism.
The historical decomposition of the 
path of residential investment from 1995 
to 2005 is displayed in figure 9. The his-
torical decomposition for a given shock is 
based on simulating equation 1 with the 
estimated values of the coefficients, as-
suming all other shocks are equal to zero 
and that the given shock is equal to its es-
timate for each period of the decomposi-
tion. The contributions of the individual 
shocks,  ˆ ˆ ˆ , , It Nt Rt ε ε ε , plus the two unidenti-
fied residuals add up to the observed path 
of residential investment. Consequently, 
figure 9 can be used for assessing which 
shocks contributed the most to the dy-
namics of residential investment. In the 
figure, the dark blue line represents the 
trend path of residential investment im-
plied by the VAR when all the shocks are 
set to zero, the black line is the empirical 
path, and the light blue line is the path 
corresponding to the shock(s) indicated in 
the header of the individual panels of the 
figure.
Figure 9, panel A reveals that the in-
vestment-specific technological change of 
the late 1990s acted as a drag on residen-
tial investment. However, by 2004, the 
capital accumulation generated by this 
technological  change meant that house-
holds were wealthier than otherwise. 
FiguRE 8
Responses to shock
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FiguRE 9
Residential investment, 1995:Q1–2005:Q4
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Consequently, residential investment is eventually 
driven above its trend by the end of the sample. Panel 
B shows that N-shocks have had relatively little impact 
on residential investment, except during the 2001 re-
cession and that recession’s slow recovery. However, 
these shocks began exerting a strong positive influence 
toward the end of 2003. The mechanism for this is 
similar to that for I-shocks—technological change in-
creases capital accumulation and wealth. From panel 
C, we see that monetary policy, through the R-shocks, 
seems to have had very little impact. Toward the end 
of the sample, these shocks exert a small positive in-
fluence, however. Panel D shows that the three identi-
fied shocks together account for almost all the surge 
of residential investment above its trend toward the 
end of the sample. Given the small contribution of the 
R-shocks around this time, this result suggests that the 
unusually high levels of residential investment in  
recent years may just be the direct result of the wealth 
accumulation from previously high rates of technologi-
cal progress. In other words, according to the econo-
metric analysis, the recent high rates of residential 
investment appear to have been driven mostly by fun-
damentals and not unusually loose monetary policy 
or speculative building.
The increase in homeownership
We now turn to the homeownership rate. Recall 
from figure 3 that the homeownership rate rose from 
about 64 percent in 1995 to about 69 percent in 2005. 
In this section, we describe how homeownership has 
changed along various demographic, income, educa-
tional, and regional lines. It then addresses the question 
of how much of the overall increase in homeowner-
ship can be attributed to changes in the distribution of 
households among these different categories. This is 38 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
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Homeownership rates and percent of population for various household characteristics
  Percent of population   Homeownership rates
          Change            Change
    1993  2003  1993–2003   1993  2003  1993–2003
Overall        64.68  68.39  3.71
Race of household head
  White   84.50   82.69   –1.81   68.62   72.32   3.70
  Black   11.77   12.31   0.60   42.96   47.58   4.62
  Other   3.73   4.99   1.26   44.04   54.53   10.49
Age of household head
  18–24   4.90   4.81   –0.09   12.43   15.91   3.48
  25–29   8.55   7.20   –1.35   34.63   39.64   5.01
  30–34   11.49   9.88   –1.61   50.98   54.75   3.77
  35–39   12.08   10.06   –2.02   61.55   64.59   3.04
  40–44   11.03   11.37   0.34   69.05   70.96   1.91
  45–54   17.35   20.79   3.44   75.42   76.02   0.60
  55–74   25.01   25.35   0.34   80.63   81.71   1.08
  >74   9.59   10.54   0.95   72.54   78.48   5.94
Gender of household head
  Male   70.68   70.50   –0.18   70.95   74.31   3.36
  Female   29.32   29.50   0.18   49.51   54.21   4.70
Marital status of household head
  Married, spouse present   54.02   51.51   –2.51   79.41   83.37   3.96
  Unmarried, or spouse absent   45.98   48.49   2.51   47.38   52.47   5.09
Children in the household
  None   61.28   62.77   1.49   64.77   68.17   3.40
  One   15.73   15.48   –0.25   63.36   68.04   4.68
  Two   14.59   13.76   –0.83   67.59   71.26   3.67
  Three   5.84   5.65   –0.19   64.98   68.00   3.02
  Four or more   2.57   2.34   –0.23   53.50   60.42   6.92
Adults in the household
  One   30.87   32.54   1.67   45.65   52.27   6.62
  Two   54.34   52.47   –1.87   71.88   75.47   3.59
  Three   10.61   10.64   0.03   77.32   78.55   1.23
  Four or more   4.18   4.35   0.17   79.40   78.67   –0.73
Region
  North East   19.85   18.66   –1.19   62.16   64.64   2.48
  North Central   23.89   23.12   –0.77   67.85   73.14   5.29
  South   35.54   37.00   1.46   66.33   70.08   3.75
  West   20.72   21.22   0.50   60.69   63.79   3.10
Education of household head
  Less than high school   19.33   17.44   –1.89   58.77   57.75   –1.02
  High school graduate   35.50   28.35   –7.15   64.67   68.52   3.85
  Some college   19.88   27.26   7.38   63.20   67.71   4.51
  College graduate   14.08   17.30   3.22   67.25   73.25   6.00
  Postgraduate   11.20   9.64   –1.56   74.35   80.40   6.05
Source: American Housing Survey.
useful for assessing the extent to which other factors, 
including the introduction of new mortgage products, 
are needed to account for the increase in homeowner-
ship. The analysis in this section borrows from Segal 
and Sullivan (1998). The data underlying the analysis 
are from the American Housing Survey (AHS).8
Cross-sectional changes in homeownership
Table 1 displays how homeownership has changed 
between 1993 and 2003 along various demographic, 
educational, and regional lines, and table 2 does the 
same for income deciles. When referring to an indi-
vidual characteristic, the unit of analysis is the house-
hold head. Also contained in these tables is the change 39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Homeownership rate, by income  deciles
    Percent of population    Homeownership rates
    Change      Change
    1993–2003   1993   2003   1993–2003
  1   –0.33   0.39   0.43   0.04
  2   –1.67   0.45   0.49   0.04
  3   –0.81   0.52   0.52   0.00
  4   0.75   0.54   0.58   0.04
  5   –1.29   0.63   0.61   –0.02
  6   –1.25   0.64   0.67   0.03
  7   0.18   0.72   0.75   0.03
  8   –0.55   0.79   0.82   0.03
  9   0.90   0.86   0.88   0.02
  10   4.06   0.92   0.93   0.01




Contributions to 1993–2003 change in homeownership rate
  Base year  
  1993   2003
Included variables   Δh  Δw   Δh   Δw
Age only   2.56   1.14   2.45   1.25
Demographic + regional   3.51   0.20   3.51   0.19
Demographic + regional + ed. + inc.   1.86   1.84   1.94   1.76
Notes: The figures reflect actual 1993–2003 data. The change in the homeownership  
rate is 3.70.
in the proportion of household heads that belong to 
each category. We do not discuss all the entries in 
these tables, but instead focus on two features of the 
tables that play roles in the analysis to follow.
The first and most important observation is that 
all but two categories in both tables display an increase 
in homeownership rates between 1993 and 2003. The 
two categories with declining homeownership rates 
are households with four or more adults, and household 
heads with less than a high school education. That the 
increase in homeownership cuts across so many dif-
ferent categorizations suggests that the overall home-
ownership rate is not merely reflecting changes in the 
distribution of the population among the categories. 
Something fundamental about the homeownership 
process has changed.
The second key observation is that among the 
different age groups, younger household heads expe-
rienced larger increases than middle-aged household 
heads. Consistent with the large increases in home-
ownership rates of younger household heads, single 
household heads have larger increases in 
homeownership rates than married house-
hold heads and other households with 
more than one adult. The pattern of hom-
eownership among the young is a striking 
reversal of a trend seen between 1978 and 
1993. Between 1978 and 1993, home-
ownership rates dropped for household 
heads under 40. This drop in homeowner-
ship rates coincided with a fall in mar-
riage rates and the fraction of households 
with children for household heads under 
40. This is consistent with the fact that 
starting a family has traditionally been 
one of the main instigators of homeown-
ership. From this perspective, the increase 
in homeownership among younger house-
hold heads from 1993 and 2003 suggests 
that there might have been a reversal in 
rates of family formation among the 
young. Yet, marriage rates and the likeli-
hood of a household having children by 
age of household head are about the same 
for 2003 and 1993. Clearly some other 
factor is driving homeownership among 
younger household heads.
The impact of changes in the 
distribution of households
Tables 1 and 2 show that there were 
noticeable changes between 1993 and 
2003 in the distribution of household 
heads among the various categories. For example, the 
share of younger household heads fell, while that of 
older household heads has risen. Since older house-
hold heads tend to have higher homeownership rates 
than their younger counterparts, this change in distri-
bution raises the economy-wide homeownership rate. 
Next, we consider, a decomposition of the overall ho-
meownership rate into parts due to changes in the 
household head distribution and changes in the home-
ownership rate.
The basis for the decomposition is a simple lin-
ear probability model. This relates the probability that 
a household head owns her house as a linear function 
of household characteristics. Specifically,
h x t x t i i t , , , , ( ) = ′ = β 1993 2003
where xi is a column vector of dummy variables for 
household i corresponding to each of the characteris-
tics in tables 1 and 2, and β is a column vector of co-
efficients. For example, if the household head is 40 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
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Effects of changes in distribution
of household characteristics
  Base year  
  1993   2003
Demographic and regional   0.48   0.47
  Age  1.15   1.29
  Sex   0.01   0.01
  Marital status   –0.35   –0.36
  Household size and composition   –0.13   –0.21
  Race   –0.22   –0.27
  Region   0.02   0.01
Education and income   1.36   1.29
  Education   0.15   0.06
  Income   1.21   1.24
between the ages of 18 and 24, then the dummy cor-
responding to this characteristic is set equal to one 
and the dummies corresponding to the other age cate-
gories are equal to zero. We estimate two linear prob-
ability models, one using data from the 1993 AHS 
and one using data from the 2003 AHS.
The linear probability model is related to the 
overall homeownership rate in year t ht , , as follows:




= ( ) =
∈ ∑ , , , , 1993 2003
where wi is the sample weight (the number of house-
holds in the population that each individual household 
in the sample represents divided by the total number 
of households in the population) for household i, and 
Nt is the year t sample. Given this relationship, the 
change in the overall homeownership rate can be  
decomposed into two parts. In addition, there are two 
ways to construct this decomposition, depending on 
the choice of the base year.
The decomposition is
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Here, B denotes the base year for the decomposition, 
and ∼ B means “not the base year.” So if B is 1993, 
then ∼ B is 2003, and vice versa. The term Δh corre-
sponds to the first term in square brackets and Δw 
corresponds to the second term. These variables cor-
respond to the two channels through which the home-
ownership rate changes. The term Δh captures the part 
due to changes in the household-level homeownership 
rates, holding fixed the sample weights. The term Δw 
captures the part due to holding fixed the individual-
level homeownership rates, but allowing the sample 
weights, that is, the household distribution, to change. 
Since the sample weights and their changes depend 
on the choice of base year, the decomposition also de-
pends on which base year is chosen. Without a com-
pelling reason to choose one base year over the other, 
we consider decompositions based on each base year.
The decomposition for the two possible choices 
of base year is shown in table 3. Each row of the  
table corresponds to different sets of variables in the 
linear probability model. The table shows that when 
the income and education variables are excluded 
from the model (the first two rows), then the Δh term 
accounts for most of the overall change in homeown-
ership. If true, this would mean that factors influenc-
ing individual homeownership rates, and not changes 
in the characteristics of the population, are by far the 
most important factor underlying the overall change 
in homeownership. However, once the education and 
income variables are included in the model (the third 
row), then the share attributable to the change in weights 
rises to about one-half. This result is driven primarily 
by the income variables due to the fact that the shares 
of the higher income household heads have risen, and 
higher levels of income are associated with higher 
levels of homeownership.
Table 4 decomposes the effects of the changes in 
weights (the Δw terms) into the effects of the main 
groups of characteristics. This verifies that age and 
income are the main factors driving this component 
of the change in homeownership. An older and higher 
income population will tend to have a higher overall 
homeownership rate without any other changes in the 
economy. Still, table 3 indicates that part of the increase 
in homeownership remains unexplained. In the next 
section, we consider this unexplained portion of the 
rise in homeownership and relate it to the high levels 
of residential investment.
Connecting the booms in residential  
investment and homeownership
Here, we connect the boom in homeownership 
with the boom in residential investment. We argue 
that developments in the mortgage market have led  
to a large expansion of the pool of potential home-
owners by lowering borrowing constraints.9 Suppose 
a householder in 1995 would have preferred to buy at 
terms available in 2005 but, because these terms were 41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
not available in 1995, chose to rent. If rental housing 
is not perfectly substitutable with owned housing in 
the short run, as is likely the case because of moral 
hazard considerations, then the availability of 2005 
mortgage terms increases the demand for owned 
housing. All else being equal, this should increase the 
quantity of housing supplied and raise the share of 
residential investment in GDP. In the long run, rental 
and owned housing are essentially perfect substitutes. 
As the homeownership rate reaches its new, less bor-
rowing-constrained, equilibrium level, we would ex-
pect residential investment as a share of GDP to return 
to “normal” levels. The remainder of this section con-
siders the possible connection between mortgage inno-
vation and homeownership and residential investment 
in more detail.
The dramatic rise in residential investment and 
homeownership has coincided with equally dramatic 
developments in the mortgage market. Over the past 
ten years to 15 years, the mortgage market has devel-
oped substantially in four areas. First, technological 
progress has reduced the cost of approving a mort-
gage under a standardized set of lending guidelines, 
in part by allowing more precise measurement of a 
borrower’s credit risk. Second, mirroring develop-
ments in financial markets more generally, many new 
kinds of mortgages have become available. Third, the 
secondary mortgage market has grown and matured 
so that many kinds of mortgages can now be pack-
aged and sold as mortgage-backed securities. Fourth, 
the mortgage market has become more specialized,  
as firms concentrate on different pieces of the market, 
including origination, servicing, and securitization.
Of these developments, the second is most im-
portant for our argument. We think that the main im-
pact of the other three developments is to increase 
competition and lower transactions costs. Also, the 
development of the secondary mortgage market prob-
ably improved the risk–return tradeoff between mort-
gage-backed securities and other financial instruments. 
This would have the effect of increasing the supply of 
capital to mortgage markets. All these developments 
drive down mortgage rates. Historically, we have seen 
large swings in mortgage rates without large changes 
in the homeownership rate. So we conclude that the 
cost reductions and increases in the supply of capital 
to the mortgage market are likely to have had a rela-
tively small impact on homeownership.
In contrast, the development and dissemination 
of many new mortgage products have made it possible 
for large numbers of people to acquire mortgages 
who would have been unable to previously. Before 
the 1990s, the standard kind of mortgage required the 
potential home buyer to satisfy a relatively rigid set 
of criteria on loan-to-value ratios, income, and other 
measures of creditworthiness. This rigidity was nec-
essary for the development of the secondary market 
for mortgages. While beneficial in this respect, it ef-
fectively shut many potential homeowners out of the 
market. By reducing the remaining rigidities, the new 
mortgage products have expanded the pool of poten-
tial homeowners.
Two developments seem to have had a particularly 
large impact along this dimension. One development 
involves the so-called combo loan. These mortgages 
reduce or even eliminate entirely the need for a down 
payment. The second involves mortgages aimed at 
the “subprime” market. Subprime borrowers are indi-
viduals with low credit ratings. Subprime lending al-
lows borrowers who, in the past, would not have 
qualified for a mortgage to qualify by paying higher 
interest rates and offering more equity or lower loan-
to-value ratios. Before the development of the combo 
loan, potential buyers had to accumulate sufficient 
savings to afford the necessary down payment. Be-
fore the development of the subprime market, most 
borrowers with poor credit would not have been able 
to get a mortgage at all. It is easy to see how these de-
velopments have lowered borrowing constraints and 
made it possible for potential buyers to buy earlier or 
buy at all.
The information on mortgages collected by the 
AHS which is consistent with the above interpreta-
tion of how new kinds of mortgages have affected the 
choices available to households. For instance, among 
first-time home buyers with a mortgage, 7.9 percent 
report that no down payment was required in 1993, 
and 12.1 percent report this in 2003. It is not possible 
to determine from the AHS data whether a borrower 
has a subprime mortgage. However, the survey does 
report the interest rate paid on the primary mortgage. 
We use this to compute the coefficient of skewness of 
interest rates in 1993 and 2003. A large positive skew-
ness coefficient indicates that the distribution of inter-
est rates includes a larger fraction of relatively high 
interest rates. In 1993, the skewness coefficient is 0.59. 
In 2003, it is 1.84. This increase in skewness is consis-
tent with a greater fraction of mortgages being high in-
terest subprime mortgages, although it could also arise 
with an increased usage of adjustable rate mortgages.10
What impact have these changes had on home 
buying? Since the most constrained home buyers are 
first-time buyers and first-time buyers are typically 
young, we can use table 1 to assess the possible im-
pact of the changes in the structure of mortgages.  
Table 1 shows that homeownership rates for young 42 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
buyers have risen by much more than for older buy-
ers, except for the oldest buyers (>74). So, for buyers 
under 40 the changes in homeownership rates are all 
greater than 3 percent, while for buyers from age 40 
to age 74 the changes are all less than 2 percent.
The evidence so far is consistent with the mort-
gage developments increasing the pool of buyers.  
The last question we address is whether this increase 
in the pool is large compared to the recently high levels 
of residential investment and homeownership. Given 
the paucity of data we have to work with at this time, 
our calculations are rough and tentative. We first make 
a rough estimate of the additional homeowners due to 
the subprime lending. Our hypothesis is that these  
homeowners come from the ranks of renters, so we 
compare this magnitude with changes in the rental 
vacancy rate. To assess the potential impact on resi-
dential investment and homeownership, we also com-
pare our calculated increase in the number of new 
homeowners due to subprime lending with changes  
in the number of housing completions and the unex-
plained portion of the increase in homeownership dis-
played in table 3.
Using data on the volume of home purchase mort-
gage originations in 2002 (from the Mortgage Bank-
ers Association), the average loan amount in 2002 
(Federal Housing Finance Board), and the fact that  
10 percent of such originations were subprime mort-
gages (Gramlich, 2005), we calculate that about 673,000 
subprime mortgages were issued for home purchases 
in 2002. In 1994, 76 percent of new originations were 
for home purchases (Federal Housing Finance Board). 
Combining this information with numbers on the vol-
ume of the subprime mortgage market and the average 
loan amount in 1994 (Gramlich, 2005), we calculate 
that about 242,000 subprime mortgages were issued 
for home purchases in 1994. So between 1994 and 
2002, there was an increase of 431,000 subprime 
home purchases.
Assuming that the home buyers using these sub-
prime mortgages would previously have been excluded 
from the mortgage market, this increase in subprime 
purchases must be accompanied by a reduction of 
similar scale in renting households (assuming no sub-
stitution between rental and owned housing units and 
no impact on the formation of new households). In 
this case, we should have seen an increase in the rent-
al vacancy rate. In fact, between 1994 and 2002, there 
was an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the rental 
vacancy rate (U.S. Census Bureau). This increase in 
the vacancy rate translates into 570,000 additional  
vacant rental units in 2002.11 By this calculation, the 
additional subprime lending accounts for 76 percent 
(431,000/570,000) of the increase in the rental vacancy 
rate. Additionally, the magnitude of the new subprime 
lending accounts for about 72 percent of the roughly 
600,000 additional housing completions (U.S. Census   
Bureau) in 2005 compared with 1995.
According to table 3, about 1.75 percent of the 
increase in homeownership between 1995 and 2005 
remains unexplained by changes in the cross-section-
al characteristics of the population. With 113 million 
households in 2005, this translates into two million 
additional homeowners in 2005, or an average of 
200,000 additional homeowners each year between 
1995 and 2005. The volume of subprime lending we 
calculated for 1994 is much higher in the years after-
ward (Gramlich, 2005). Consequently, by our calcula-
tions, the subprime market can easily account for the 
additional homeowners unaccounted for by changes 
in the cross-sectional characteristics of the population.
We conclude that substitution away from rental 
housing made possible by developments in the mort-
gage market, such as subprime lending, could account 
for a significant fraction of the increase in residential 
investment and homeownership. The current spend-
ing boom thus may be a temporary transition toward 
an era with higher homeownership rates and spending 
on housing, which will ultimately move nearer to his-
torical norms.
It may appear that the role of mortgage markets 
in accounting for the increase in residential investment 
contradicts our finding earlier in this article that the 
current levels of spending on housing are largely ex-
plained by technology-driven factors. We do not view 
this as a contradiction, because the kind of technolog-
ical change that made the mortgage market develop-
ments possible affected many parts of the economy. 
In particular, much of the technological change under-
lying our previous finding can be attributed to firms 
finally working out how to take advantage of innova-
tions in information technology. The advances we have 
in mind have found uses in all sectors of the economy, 
including the financial services industry, and so can 
be viewed as neutral technological change. In addi-
tion, much of the decline in the equipment price un-
derlying our estimates of the investment-specific 
shocks can be attributed to information technology. 
So investment-specific technological change has also 
contributed to the evolution of the mortgage market.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Conclusion
This article has attempted to explain two features 
of the turn of the twenty-first century U.S. economy: 
high levels of residential investment and homeowner-
ship rates. Our main findings are as follows. First, it 
appears that the housing boom has not been driven by 
unusually loose monetary policy. This is not to say the 
monetary policy has not been unusually loose, but that 
to the extent it has been loose, this is not what has been 
driving spending on housing. Second, the current lev-
els of spending on new housing are largely explained 
by technology-driven wealth creation over the previous 
decade. Third, changes in the demographic, income, 
educational, and regional structure of the population 
account for about one-half of the increase in homeown-
ership. That is, without any other developments, the 
homeownership rate is likely to have gone up anyway, 
but not by as much as it has done. The last finding is 
that substitution away from rental housing made pos-
sible by developments in the mortgage market, such 
as subprime lending, could account for a significant 
fraction of the increase in residential investment and 
homeownership.
We view our findings as supporting the view that 
the current housing boom may be a temporary transi-
tion toward an era with higher homeownership rates 
in which spending is temporarily higher than histori-
cal norms but will eventually return to such norms. 
While we have so far mostly avoided discussing hous-
ing prices, our findings do suggest that to the extent 
that house prices have grown considerably in recent 
years, this is not due to unusually excessive specula-
tion in the housing market, such as would occur in a 
bubble. Instead, our findings point toward the high 
prices being driven by fundamentals.
NOTES
1Home building and residential investment are not quite the same 
thing, since average home size and quality as well as construction 
costs vary over time. However, they are closely related, and this  
article will use the terms interchangeably.
2Household formation is also affected by conditions in the housing 
market. For example, high house prices or rental rates may induce 
singles to remain at home rather than find a place of their own. The 
discussion here implicitly assumes that these factors are overwhelmed 
by social developments, such as declines in marriage rates among 
the young, and demographic developments, such as the baby boom.
3If households typically stay in a house five years before they 
move, then the relevant expected inflation rate is over five years. 
Expectations of inflation over five years should be slower to 
change than expectations over one year.
4Median wealth has risen less than average wealth, indicating that 
wealth has become more unevenly distributed. Suppose the de-
mand for housing is an inferior good, so that demand for it grows 
less than in proportion to growth in wealth. Think Bill Gates. In this 
case, greater dispersion in wealth should lead to a decline in the 
share of housing in the aggregate portfolio.
5Progress has been made in identifying fiscal shocks. See, for ex-
ample, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004). However, there is 
much less consensus on the viability of the available identification 
strategies.
6The real price of capital equipment is measured as the NIPA defla-
tor for equipment and software divided by a consumption deflator 
derived from the NIPA deflators for consumer nondurables and  
services. Real GDP is measured in consumption units by dividing 
nominal GDP by the consumption deflator. Time t inflation is the 
difference between the date t and t – 1 values of the log of the con-
sumption deflator.
7The response of output to a shock is the accumulated response of 
Δyt. The response of residential investment is the response of ht 
plus the response of output.
8The AHS is a survey that asks questions about the quality of housing 
in the United States. In gathering information, the U.S. Census 
Bureau interviewers visit or telephone the household occupying 
each housing unit in the sample. For unoccupied units, they obtain 
information from landlords, rental agents, or neighbors. The data 
used for this article is taken from the national survey (there is also 
a metropolitan area survey). The national survey is conducted during 
a three-month to seven-month period during which interviewers 
gather information on housing throughout the country. The survey 
covers about 55,000 housing units every two years, in odd-numbered 
years, and is available only through 2003.
9Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005) make a similar argu-
ment in the context of a formal model of the life cycle.
10Note that looking at average down payments as a fraction of price 
is not very informative about the relaxation of borrowing constraints, 
since combo loans involve smaller down payments and subprime 
loans involve larger down payments, compared to conventional 
mortgages.
11In 2002, 32.1 percent of households rented and the vacancy rate 
was 8.9 percent. With 108.2 million occupied housing units, the 
number of vacant units equals 0.321 × 108.2 million / 0.911 = 38 
million. Thus, 1.5 percent of 38 million is 0.57 million.44 3Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
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